01
Background & Motivation
This is my first writeup, so bear with me if some parts feel rough around the edges — I'm learning as I go. But the finding itself was real, impactful, and absolutely worth documenting.
During a normal recon session on Bugcrowd, I was browsing US government sites listed under their Vulnerability Disclosure Programs (VDP). VDPs don't offer monetary payouts — but they're a fantastic learning ground. You're hacking legally, the targets are real, and the stakes matter because real people's data is on the line.
I came across one of the USA government court portals — a site that looked visually dated but was still actively in use. Most people would scroll past it. I decided to dig in.
The first thing I noticed was a standard login page. Nothing unusual — but old government sites often have forgotten endpoints lurking just beneath the surface. My next move was the Wayback Machine.
# Fetching all archived URLs for the target domain
https://web.archive.org/web/20250000000000*/redacted.gov
The Wayback Machine returned a healthy list of historical URLs. Most endpoints were well-protected — they returned 401 Unauthorized or redirected to the login page when accessed without authentication. The site appeared reasonably secure despite its age.
Among all the archived URLs, every single endpoint required authentication except one. A single .cfm page was completely accessible without any login — and it was serving live data.
The URL that caught my eye was simple — a ColdFusion endpoint (.cfm) with a single numeric parameter:
Initial URL
https://redacted.gov/e/a.cfm?ID=2000
200 OK
I opened the page and immediately saw sensitive court personnel data — emails and full names of staff members. No login required. No token validation. Just an open URL. I checked the program scope and confirmed that while this specific endpoint was technically out of scope, the data exposure was serious enough that I couldn't just ignore it.
The next logical step — I started incrementing the ID parameter manually. This is the textbook definition of an IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference): the server trusts whatever ID you send, without verifying that you're actually authorized to see that record.
Base
https://redacted.gov/e/a.cfm?ID=2000
Leaking data
+1
https://redacted.gov/e/a.cfm?ID=2001
Leaking data
+2
https://redacted.gov/e/a.cfm?ID=2002
Leaking data
+3
https://redacted.gov/e/a.cfm?ID=2003
Leaking data
…
Continue iterating… every ID returns a new victim's data
Each ID returned a unique record — a different person's information. The endpoint was essentially a paginated, unprotected dump of the court's entire personnel and case-party database, accessible by anyone with the URL pattern.
The leaking endpoint exposed approximately 200,000 records containing emails and full names of court personnel and accused individuals from a US state court. This data could have enabled targeted phishing attacks, doxing, social engineering, or intimidation of witnesses and defendants — all without any hacking tools, just a browser.
05
Step-by-Step Walkthrough
1
Target Selection on Bugcrowd VDP
Browsing US government sites on Bugcrowd's Vulnerability Disclosure Program. Identified a court portal running an older tech stack (ColdFusion). Chose it as a learning target — even without a payout, the experience matters.
2
Login Page Recon
The home page presented a standard login form. Rather than attacking the login itself, I pivoted to historical URL discovery — a much faster way to find forgotten or misconfigured endpoints on legacy systems.
3
Wayback Machine Enumeration
Queried the Wayback Machine for all indexed URLs under the domain. Reviewed each historical endpoint. Every URL except one redirected to login or returned a 401. The outlier was /e/a.cfm — a forgotten, unguarded page.
4
Identified the Vulnerable Parameter
Opened https://redacted.gov/e/a.cfm?ID=2000 and confirmed it returned real PII — names and email addresses — without any authentication prompt. Noted the sequential numeric ID parameter immediately.
5
Manual IDOR Verification
Manually changed ID to 2001, 2002, 2003. Each returned a completely different person's data. The server applied zero authorization checks — any number in the parameter range was served freely. Confirmed IDOR across the entire ID range.
6
Responsible Disclosure
Despite the endpoint being out of scope, I emailed the site's webmaster directly with a clear, concise report detailing the vulnerability, the affected URL pattern, and the potential impact. The issue was patched within a few hours of the report. No bounty — but that was never the point.
Day 1
~00:00
Target Selected on Bugcrowd VDP
Identified the USA state court portal as a recon target during a bug bounty session.
Day 1
~00:03
Vulnerability Discovered
Located the unprotected /e/a.cfm endpoint via Wayback Machine and confirmed the IDOR within minutes.
Day 1
~00:05
Scope Check & Impact Assessment
Verified the endpoint was out of scope. Assessed the exposure to be approximately 200,000 records including PII of court staff and case participants.
Day 1
~01:00
Report Sent to Webmaster
Emailed the site's webmaster with full details — URL pattern, parameter, data types exposed, and recommended fix. Kept it clear and non-technical enough for a non-security audience.
Day 1
~Few hrs
Vulnerability Fixed ✓
The endpoint was secured within a few hours of the report. The webmaster responded and the page was locked down. Fast response — great outcome.
Old tech, real risk. Legacy ColdFusion stacks are still running in production at government agencies. They often have endpoints that were created before modern security practices and never revisited.
Wayback Machine is gold. Historical URL enumeration is underrated. It reveals endpoints that are live but forgotten — often with zero access controls because no one remembered they existed.
Sequential IDs are a red flag. Any numeric ID in a URL is worth testing for IDOR. If incrementing it gives you someone else's data — that's a vulnerability, every time.
Scope doesn't mean silence. The endpoint was out of scope — but 200,000 real people's data was exposed. Always report serious PII leaks, even if there's no bounty attached. It's the right thing to do.
No tools needed. This entire finding required nothing more than a browser and the Wayback Machine. The best vulnerabilities are often the simplest. Don't overcomplicate your recon process.
This vulnerability was found in under five minutes and required zero specialized tools. No payout — but it protected approximately 200,000 people's personal information from being harvested by anyone who stumbled upon that URL. That's worth more than money. Hack ethically. Disclose responsibly. Keep learning.